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PUBLIC UTILITIES HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 -
SECTION 10(b) (1) - PUBLIC INTEREST
DETERMINATIONS
Municipal Electric Association v. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
A look at American economic history reveals a national policy
in favor of competition.1 This policy, embodied in the antitrust
laws, was founded on the premise that competition is uniquely able
to reward innovation, promote efficiency, and deter their opposites.2
For centuries, however, the common law has recognized certain call-
ings or occupations as "affected with public interest" and which do
not function well in a competitive climate.8 Because these callings
were under a duty to meet certain demands - providing maximum
service and safety at the lowest possible cost - which were best
met through economies of scale,4 regulation was necessary to insure
public benefit normally achieved through competition. 5 Where
mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations were at issue, the regula-
tory agencies operated under a theory of restricted competition, en-
couraging consolidations and discouraging new competitors if in
the public interest it was deemed necessary to promote safety, in-
crease service, and eliminate severe price discrimination.6 Although
1 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963); Small
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (1964).
2 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Antitrust and
Regulated Industries, Address by Donald I. Baker (Head of the Evaluation Section
of the Policy Planning Group, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice), Third Annual New
England Antitrust Conference, Boston, Oct. 3, 1969.
8 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); M. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 196-201 (1957); C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGUIA-
TION 51-55 (1965); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control I: The Chaos in the Cases,
106 U. PA. L REV. 641 (1958).
4 Economies of scale is an economic concept under which an industry is deemed
best able to achieve a lower cost of operation if placed in the position of a monopo-
list in a given market. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 21. Synonomous with large-
scale production, economies of scale is held to have certain advantages which are en-joyed not only by the firm itself but also by the industry. Such advantages include:
"[O]verhead spread over a larger output; more funds available for advertising, re-
search, etc; ... and the ability to have greater continuity of operations." P. TAYLOR,
A NEW DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 166 (1966). Economies of scale is desirable
in terms of cost to the public for it makes little economic sense, for example, to have
four different airlines simultaneously flying half-empty planes to the same destination.
5 Regulation was designed to serve as a substitute for competition only where com-
petition did not secure some specifically defined social goal or was not economically
feasible. Antitrust considerations were to be excluded only to the extent necessary to
make the specific regulatory scheme work. See generally Address by Donald I.
Baker, supra note 2.
6Restricting competition was especially necessary where rate maintenance was to
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this theory of restricted competition was inherently inconsistent with
the national economic policy, its goals and those of the antitrust
laws were set at achieving the same end - the best allocation of
economic resources.
With two divergent concepts aimed at accomplishing a single
objective, the question raised was to what extent, if at all, the regu-
latory agencies were to consider antitrust principles in determining
whether a proposed acquisition or consolidation would be in the
public interest. Looking to their enabling legislation, the agencies
found that Congress had not always provided the answer. Some
statutes dearly directed agencies to consider the antitrust laws,'
others required only that the proposed transaction be consistent with
the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Where the latter
has been true, not only have regulators been criticized as giving
inadequate weight to competitive factors,' but courts, when forced
to interpret these statutes, have often arrived at inconsistent re-
sults.
In the recent case of Municipal Electric Association v. SEC,'°
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia faced the prob-
lem of defining the role of antitrust principles in public interest
determinations."' The main issue presented in the case was whether
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in making a deter-
mination of "public interest" under section 10(b) (1) of the Public
be achieved. Unregulated competition in the otherwise regulated industries had grave
consequences. Rate wars or severe price discrimination among competitors perpetu-
ated low rates often resulting in bankruptcy; service offered by firms suffered; adequate
outlays for improvements could not be made; maintenance was neglected; and, finally,
when competitors took steps to reduce the severity of rate competition by making agree-
ments, the firms could extract a very high rate from the consumer. C. PHILIPS, supra
note 3, at 40-41.
7 E.g., Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1964).
8 E.g., Natural Gas Act § 7, ch. 556, § 7, 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
9One of the most recent expressions of this criticism recommended that "the
President should issue a general policy statement on competition and public regula-
tion . . . [t]o encourage and urge the regulatory bodies . . . to enlarge the role of
competition in their respective industries." REPORT OF PRESIDENT NIxON's TASK
FORcE ON PRODUCrIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115 CONG. REC. 6472 (daily ed. June
16, 1969). For a penetrating critique of the overall scheme of direct regulation, see
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L REV. 548 (1969).
10 413 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
11 As used herein, the term "public interest' determinations means findings by
regulatory agencies that mergers, acquisitions, and other transactions do provide public
benefit. However, the factors supporting such findings of public benefit are those
which relate to matters other than possible violations of the antitrust laws.
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Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935,2 should have considered
evidence of anticompetitive effects in light of the public policy in
favor of competition. The court also considered the issue of which
agency is best equipped to evaluate antitrust issues when there ap-
pears to be an overlap in regulatory responsibility.
Within its authority under section 10(b) (1) of the Holding
Company Act, the SEC approved the acquisition of stock by certain
New England electric utility companies of two nuclear-power electric
generating companies - Vermont Yankee Power Corp. and Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Corp. The nuclear generating companies
were expected to produce low-cost electric energy and distribute it
to the sponsors in proportion to their share of stock ownership.
Municipal Electric Association of Massachusetts (Municipals), an
organization of officials representing municipal electric utility
companies in Massachusetts and Maine, sought an evidentiary hear-
ing before the SEC to support their position that approval of the
sponsors' stock acquisition, to the exclusion of Municipals' ability
to obtain low-cost power directly from Maine Yankee, was anti-
competitive and, thus, not consistent with the statutory standard of
public interest as prescribed by section 10(b) (1) of the Act. After
the SEC denied Municipals' request for the hearing, Municipals con-
tended on appeal" that for the SEC to deny them the opportunity
to be heard on the anticompetitive consequences flowing from SEC
approval of the stock acquisition would be inconsistent with sec-
tion 10(b) (1) of the Act which implicitly requires consideration
of the antitrust laws when making a determination in the public
interest.' 4  The SEC, however, argued that section 10(b) (1) did
not require an interpretation of public interest beyond a finding
that the stock acquisition would result in the efficient development
of an integrated public utility system. The court of appeals, reject-
ing the Commission's argument, reasoned that in the absence of ex-
press authority to the contrary, the SEC in the exercise of its juris-
12 15 U.S.C. § 79j(b)(1) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Holding Company Act].
Section 10(b)(1) provides:
[I]he [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall approve the acquisition
unless the Commission finds that -
(1) [T]he concentration of control of public-utility companies [is] of a
kind or to an extent detrimental to the public interest or the interest of
investors or consumers.
13 Municipals sought review of the SEC orders approving the stock acquisitions
under section 24(a) of the Holding Company Act, which provides that aggrieved parties
may obtain review in the United States Courts of Appeals which may order that
additional evidence be heard. 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1964).
14 413 F.2d at 1057.
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diction under section 10 of the Act was to give adequate considera-
tion to anticompetitive consequences when making its public interest
determination. Notwithstanding this finding, the SEC further
argued that inasmuch as Municipals' complaint was directed at the
anticompetitive effects resulting from the allocation of bulk power,
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and not the SEC was the
responsible agency before whom a hearing should have been sought.
Rejecting this argument, the court held that the SEC was the proper
agency to review Municipals' complaint. 5
The statutory framework within which administrative agencies
are to make public interest determinations concerning mergers, ac-
quisitions, and consolidations has not been fashioned according to
any readily apparent scheme. The extent to which agencies must
consider anticompetitive effects in passing upon proposed trans-
actions varies with the specific regulatory statute under which they
operate. One group of agencies such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC)'- and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC)17 are required by statute to consider the public interest
151d. at 1060-61.
16 Section 5, paragraph 11 of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 provides:
[A~ny carriers or other corporations ... participating in a transaction [con-
sistent with the public interest and] approved or authorized under the pro-
visions of this section shall be and they are relieved from the operation of
the antitrust laws .... Ch. 104, § 5, 24 Star. 380, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5,
par. (ii) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Interstate Commerce Act].
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first regulatory agency, was cre-
ated by Congress in 1887 to protect the public from monopolization of the transportation
industry by the railroad barons of the era. With the ICC as a model, Congress subse-
quently enacted the enabling legislation for other such agencies. To many businessmen,
elimination of competition was desirable because competition only increased risk and
decreased profit:
It is important to note, however, that the reforms ... might never have suc-
ceeded in imposing regulatory controls had not many carriers and utilities
perceived reasons of self-interest to welcome them .... [S]ome farsighted
business leaders saw regulation as the only alternative to government expro-
priation. Others saw it as protection against competition. Posner, supra
note 9, at 622.
17With respect to telephone communication, section 221(a) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 provides:
If the Commission finds that the proposed consolidation, acquisition, or
control will be of advantage to the persons to whom service is to be ren-
dered and in the public interest, it shall certify to that effect; and thereupon
any Act or Acts of Congress making the proposed transaction unlawful
shall notapply. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1964).
With respect to telegraph communications, section 222(c)(1) of the Communications
Act provides:
If the Commission finds that the proposed consolidation or merger ... is in
the public interest, the Commission shall enter an order approving ... such
... and thereupon any law or laws making consolidations and mergers un-
lawful shall not apply .... Id. § 222(c) (1).
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but are not provided with specific statutory guidance concerning
the weight to be given anticompetitive effects in passing on pro-
posed transactions. Such agencies exercise broad discretion as to
the proper weight that should be accorded anticompetitive effects
in their deliberations. First, they are empowered under section 11
of the Clayton Act 8 to enforce1 9 compliance with section 7 of that
act.20 Second, transactions approved under the public interest stan-
dard are immune from subsequent antitrust attack by private par-
ties or the Justice Department.2' This combination of exclusive
enforcement power and transactional immunity operates, in ef-
fect, to raise a presumption that probable anticompetitive effects
have been adequately considered.22 Consequently, the question of
It is important to note that under the Communications Act immunity from antitrust
laws is given only to telephone and telegraph communications and not television or
radio broadcast systems. For a comparison of the language contained in the Communi-
cations Act pertaining to television and radio broadcasting, see note 24 infra.
18 Ch. 323, § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1964).
The pertinent language reads:
Authority to enforce compliance with sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this
title. .. is vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission... Federal Com-
munications Commission .. . Civil Aeronautics Board ... Federal Reserve
Board ... and in the Federal Trade Commission .... Id.
19 Clayton 11 enforcement power is construed to give primary jurisdiction in the
antitrust area to any agency having that power, and primary jurisdiction carries with
it the doctrine that one must exhaust his remedies before seeking judicial relief.
This jurisdictional doctrine requires, in brief, that the litigant resort to the administra-
tive tribunal created by the regulatory legislation before seeking to enforce the and-
trust laws in court. Its origins lay in rate reparation cases wherein relief was held
to be available before the Interstate Commerce Commission and not the courts.
Later on the primary jurisdiction concept spread into other areas of regulation and now
finds widespread application. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-
Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L REV. 577, 581-83 (1954).
20 Ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1964).
21See Interstate Commerce Act § 5, 49 U.S.C. § 5, par. (11) (1964); Communica-
tions Act §§ 221(a), (c) (1), 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), (c) (1) (1964); Federal Avia-
tion Act § 408(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1964).22 Because the enforcement provisions of section 11 of the Clayton Act confer pri-
mary jurisdiction on agencies such as the ICC and FCC [see note 18 supra] and their
approvals are given antitrust immunity, once the agency has shown that the "public
interest" factors of service, safety, and low rates exist, the courts are reluctant to
question agency discretion with respect to probable anticompetitive effects:
T he Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the effects of curtail-
ment of competition which will result from the proposed consolidation and
consider them along with the advantages of improved service, safer operation,
etc... Resolving these considerations is a complex task which requires ex-
tensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the ... in-
dustry. Congress left that task to the Commission .... If the Commission
did not exceed the statutory limits within which Congress confined its discre-
tion... it is not our function to upset its order. McLean Trucking Co. v.
United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944).
See also United States v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 141 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1955),
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the weight accorded anticompetitive effects is left in the hands of
the particular agency. A second group of agencies however, such
as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), are given more explicit
guidelines by Congress. They are required to consider competitive
factors and only upon finding the public interest to clearly out-
weigh any anticompetitive effects can they approve the proposed
transaction 3 A third group of agencies, such as the SEC,24 oper-
where the court held that the government could not maintain an antitrust action
against a defendant where a rate agreement had been approved by the Federal Mari-
time Commission. The jurisdiction to determine whether the rate agreement had
been correctly interpreted was vested in the Maritime Commission and any acts done
pursuant to their approval are exempt from the antitrust laws.
23 Section 408 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act provides:
Unless... the Board finds that the consolidation, merger ... or acquisition
of control will not be consistent with the public interest... it shall by order
approve such consolidation, merger.., or acquisition of control... Provided,
That the Board shall not approve any consolidation, merger.., or acquisi-
tion of control which would result in creating a monopoly... and thereby
restrain competition .... 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1964).
Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act provides:
Any person affected by any order made under section 1378 . .. shall be,
and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws', as
designated in section 12 of Title 15 .... Id. § 1384.
Although the Act does not specifically use terms that reflect balancing, the proviso
has been interpreted to require such an approach. See Butler Aviation Co. v. CAB,
389 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1968). In Butler, petitioner sought review of an acquisition
by Eastern Airlines of all the stock of another aircraft corporation. The court, denying
review, stated that where a transaction involves antitrust issues, the Aviation Act pre-
vents CAB approval of a transaction if the transaction's effects will be so extreme as to
violate the proviso, but requires approval if "it finds the disadvantage of any curtail-
meat of competition to be outweighed by 'the advantages of improved service."' Id.
at 519 (emphasis added).
With respect to the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)(5)(B) (Supp. IV, 1969), more dearly expresses the balancing approach:
The responsible agency shall not approve - any... proposed merger transac-
don whose effect... may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly... unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the prob-
able effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served. Id. (emphasis added).
See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). There the United
States challenged a bank merger approved under the Bank Merger Act as being a viola-
tion of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court, denying the merger, stated: "Con-
gress intended bank mergers first to be subject to the usual antitrust analysis; if a
merger failed that scrutiny, it was to be permissible only if the merging banks could
establish that the merger's benefits to the community would outweigh its anticom-
petitive disadvantages." Id. at 182.
2 4 l addition to the SEC [in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 10(b)(1)
of the Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79j(b)(1) (1964)], the FPC, and the FCC
(with respect to radio and television broadcasting systems) fit into this grouping.
The Natural Gas Act, which is under the jurisdiction of the FPC, provides:
No natural-gas company... shall ... acquire or operate any such facilities
or extension thereof, unless there is in force... a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or
operations .... 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
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ate under statutes which, like those in the first group, are conspic-
uously silent as to the applicability of the antitrust laws and require
only that the agency find the proposed transaction consistent with
the public interest. However, unlike the first group, these agencies
are neither given specific enforcement powers under section 11 of
the Clayton Act nor are transactions accomplished pursuant to their
approval immune from later antitrust attack.
Without specific or implied congressional mandates requiring
the agencies in the third group to consider competition, the courts
have searched for bases to ascertain the extent to which the public
interest standard necessitates consideration of antitrust principles.
Some courts have applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 25
when transactions have been challenged as violating the antitrust
laws, and have required the parties to seek agency resolution of the
issues before entertaining the suits. 26  Such action tends to empha-
size agency discretion with respect to the weight to be given anti-
competitive effects because the doctrine is based on the notion
that the agency has particular expertise to examine the public in-
terest. Thus, if the public interest determination is questionable,
presumably the agency decision will stand, notwithstanding prob-
able antitrust violations. In other instances the primary jurisdiction
doctrine has been rejected.17  Many courts have insisted on apply-
ing antitrust laws to regulated industries unless barred by a statutory
exemption for the type of conduct under judicial scrutiny. Other
courts, reasoning that regulation and competition are mutually exclu-
sive concepts, have concluded that the introduction of one neces-
The Communications Act, with respect to radio and television broadcasting, pro-
vides:
[Njo construction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder, shall
be transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner... except upon appli-
cation to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that public
interest, convenience and necessity will be served thereby. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)
(1964).
Neither of the above Acts contain any language pertaining to the applicability of the
antitrust laws.
2 5 See Jaffe, supra note 19, at 581-83.
2 6 See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.
1953); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd,
343 U.S. 414 (1951); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 104 F. Supp. 46 (D.
Minn. 1952). See generally W. JONES, CASES ON REGULATED INDUS'TRIES 824-918
(1967); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI Application of the Antitrust Laws
to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962).
2 7 See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d
741 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See generally W. JONES supra note 26, at 824-918.
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sitates disappearance of the other.2 In short, where Congress has
failed to delineate precise standards establishing the applicability
of antitrust principles for this third group of agencies, upon judi-
cial review "[s]ome courts hold business subject to [regulatoryl en-
actments to be free from rules prohibiting restraints of trade; others
do not. New cases are decided without reference to old precedents
and the courts in general have been unable to explain coherently
the conclusions they have reached."29
With this confusing and unsettled array of authority as a back-
ground, the first question confronting the Municipal court was
whether the SEC, in making its public interest determination, ade-
quately considered the probable anticompetitive effects which
would ensue from the approved stock acquisition. The court's
holding that section 10(b) (1) required a more definitive evalua-
tion of anticompetitive factors prior to its approval of a stock ac-
quisition may be representative of a judicial trend to require agencies
making public interest determinations pursuant to statutes silent as
to the applicability of the antitrust laws to give greater weight to
anticompetitive effects. The court found support for its holding
in SEC v. New England Electric System,30 where the Supreme
Court, construing section 11(b) (1) of the Holding Company Act,
stated that "the theme of elimination of 'restraint of free and inde-
pendent competition' " is a theme that runs throughout the Act. 1
This dictum, however, while constituting an expression of the broad
policy running throughout the Holding Company Act,32 was only
aimed at an interpretation of the public interest standard as gener-
ally requiring the consideration of competitive factors when ap-
proving any particular acquisition under the Holding Company
Act. The Municipal court found added support for its position in
California v. FPC3 by drawing an analogy between the statutory
28 See Hale & Hale, supra note 3, at 642.
2)-Id. at 681.
30 384 U.S. 176 (1966). The Court, interpreting the "single-integrated" public
utility requirement of section 11(b) (1) of the Holding Company Act [15 U.S.C. §
79k(b) (1) (1964)), held that the SEC was warranted in ruling that the Act prohibits
a public utility holding company from retaining an integrated gas utility system in
addition to its integrated electric utility system, unless the gas utility system sought
to be retained could not be soundly and economically operated independently of the
principal system.
3' 384 U.S. at 183.
82 Section 1(b) of the Holding Company Act provides:
[lt is declared that the national public interest ... may be adversely af-
fected... when subsidiary public-utility companies are subjected to ... re-
straint of free and independent competition .... 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1964).
33 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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standard of public interest expressed in section 7 of the Natural Gas
Act,8 and that expressed in section 10(b) (1) of the Holding Com-
pany Act. In the California case the Supreme Court found that a
merger approved by the FPC pursuant to its authority under sec-
tion 7 of the Natural Gas Act did not carry with it actual or im-
plied immunity from the antitrust laws. The Court held further
that evidence of antitrust violations is plainly relevant in determin-
ing whether a particular transaction is within the public interest. 5
Continuing the analogy, the court of appeals also relied upon North-
ern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,36 where the FPC's approval of the
construction and operation of a gas line was challenged as being
detrimental to the public interest. The court, remanding for fur-
ther consideration of the probable anticompetitive effects, con-
cluded:
[Alithough the Commission is not bound by the dictates of the
antitrust laws, it is clear that antitrust concepts are intimately in-
volved in a determination of what action is in the public interest,
and therefore the Commission is obliged.., to make findings re-
lated to the pertinent antitrust policies, draw conclusions from the
findings, and weigh these conclusions along with other important
public interest considerationsX3
Thus, applying the dictum in the New England Electric case,
and drawing support through analogy from the California and
Northern Natural Gas cases, the Municipal court reasoned that a
determination of public interest made pursuant to section 10(b) (1)
required a more adequate consideration of probable anticompetitive
effects than had been given by the SEC in passing on the sponsors'
acquisition of Yankees' stock. The court further reasoned that the
exemption given under section 7 of the Clayton Act33 to transac-
tions duly consummated pursuant to the SEC's authority under sec-
tion 10(b) (1), was a dear expression of congressional intent to
34 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
35 369 U.S. at 485-86.
36 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
37 Id. at 958-59.
38 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Clayton 7 contains an exemption from its effects as
follows:
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consum-
mated pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal
Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the exercise
of its jurisdiction under [the Holding Company Act], the United States
Maritime Commission, or the Secretary of Agriculture under any statutory
provision vesting such power in such Commission, Secretary, or Board. Id.
(emphasis added).
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have the SEC adequately consider the probable anticompetitive
consequences of its decisionsY9
Although adopting an interpretation of public interest which
demands a more detailed examination of anticompetitive factors, the
court limited its finding to the inadequate examination conducted
by the SEC in the case before it. In doing so, the court failed to
delineate any meaningful guidelines with respect to the depth of
an adequate inquiry into anticompetitive factors. Thus, a weakness
of the decision is its failure to answer the question of what weight
should be accorded antitrust policy when an agency is directed to
appraise a transaction pursuant to a statute requiring no more than
a finding in the public interest.
Analysis of the regulatory scheme patterned by Congress sug-
gests a congressional trend toward maximizing the weight to be
given antitrust principles in public interest determinations. In
dealing with the first group of regulatory agencies, Congress pro-
vided that they be given antitrust enforcement power and transac-
tional immunity from the antitrust laws. As a result, such agencies
need only attach minimal weight to antitrust principles when mak-
ing public interest determinations. Some of the agencies comprising
this group were among the first administrative agencies created by
Congress.4 ° The statutes vesting authority in agencies falling into
the second group, however, were enacted more recently.4 ' These
agencies are given specific congressional directives to balance the
factors normally present in public interest determinations with pos-
sible anticompetitive effects and approve transactions only if the
anticompetitive effects are clearly outweighed. This constitutes an
apparent shift in congressional attitude toward emphasizing the im-
portance of antitrust considerations at the agency level in the con-
text of public interest determinations. It further suggests that the
courts in establishing public interest determination standards for
the third group of agencies might properly require them to give
more weight to antitrust factors. Perhaps agencies in this group
should approve transactions as being in the public interest only if no
probable anticompetitive effects would result.2 The Municipal
court's simple holding that the SEC's consideration of anticompeti-
89 413 F.2d at 1057.
10 See note 16 supra.
41Sgee Federal Aviation Act § 201, 49 U.S.C. § 1321 (1964).
42 Cf. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
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five effects was inadequate 3 fails to explore such alternatives, and
as a result the decision leaves this troublesome question untouched.
The second issue confronting the Municipal court was whether,
in this case, the SEC was the proper agency to pass on the anti-
trust issues presented. The SEC asserted that inasmuch as the al-
leged anticompetitive effects were directly related to the alloca-
tion and fixing of costs for the purchase and transmission of elec-
tric power, the FPC was the proper agency to adjudicate Municipals'
complaint. Rejecting the SEC's assertion, the court found that in ad-
dition to its responsibility under section 10(b) (1) to consider com-
petition when determining whether the acquisition was in keeping
with the public interest, the SEC also had the authority under section
10(e)44 to impose, if necessary, conditions which would tailor the
acquisition to meet antitrust requirements. The court indicated
that such authority under section 10(e) included directing a real-
location of power to be produced by Vermont and Maine Yankees.
The court also found that if such a reallocation were necessary, it
was the express responsibility of the SEC and did not constitute an
invasion of the FPC's jurisdiction.45 However, in remanding with-
out considering whether the SEC was in fact the most qualified
agency to review Municipals' complaint, the court may have side-
stepped the thorniest issue raised by the case.
In view of the manifest problems associated with an agency's
having to delve into areas outside the scope of its expertise, it would
seem that the court might have done well to have directed review
of Municipals' complaint to the agency best equipped to handle ques-
tions related to the power industry. To require review of a complaint
directed at the anticompetitive effects resulting from the transmis-
sion of low-cost bulk power by an agency whose primary responsibil-
ity is regulating the issuance of securities would appear to be incon-
sistent with the congressional purpose underlying the creation of a
specialized agency responsible for regulating the transmission of
power. Notwithstanding this criticism, however, it may be implied
from the opinion that the court ordered the SEC to reevaluate the
anticompetitive effects because of the potential difficulties which
43413 F-2d at 1059.
44 Section 10(e) of the Holding Company Act, provides:
The Commission, in any order approving the acquisition of securities or utility
assets, may prescribe such terms and conditions in respect of such acquisition
... as the Commission may find necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors or consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 791(e)
(1964).
45 413 F.2d at 1060.
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later would have confronted the FPC in an effort to unscramble
the new corporate structure.4 Or, perhaps the court was motivated
more by a desire to avoid similar problems in future acquisitions.
Given the proper exercise of administrative power by the SEC, the
court probably reasoned that such problems need never materialize.
The most fundamental policy question underlying the decision
in Municipal concerns whether the consideration of antitrust prind-
ples should be an integral part of the regulatory function and, if so,
are the agencies adequately equipped to consider such matters. In
answer to this question, some economists staunchly advocate that a
policy favoring competition, however slightly, is repugnant to the
theory of restricted competition under which regulated industries
are geared to operate.47 The strong national policy in favor of com-
petition, however, does not yield to such a suggestion. The fact that
this policy is not specifically set out in regulatory statutes as a stan-
dard to be followed is not to be interpreted as a license to ignore
competition. The policy is too well rooted in American economic
history to be ignored. It would seem clear, therefore, that unless
there exists a specific exemption from following the norm of com-
petition, national antitrust policy must be observed. Unfortunately,
however, the requisite proficiency to consider anticompetitive factors
does not always follow the responsibility to'do so. Regulators who
are picked for their special knowledge of the industries which they
regulate will often lack the necessary background to deal with com-
plex antitrust issues outside the scope of their particular expertise.
Complicating this lack of expertise is the failure of the agencies to
coordinate and develop meaningful inter-agency policy standards.
This leaves regulators unable to easily identify their particular areas
of responsibility when confronted with overlapping jurisdictional
problems."' In addition, Congress insistence on using broad leg-
46 Under section 20(a) of the Natural Gas Act [15 U.S.C. § 717s(a) (1964)),
the FPC may bring an action against a party for violating its orders or it may submit
evidence to the Attorney General of these or antitrust violations.
47 With regard to regulation and the antitrust laws, some observers think in
terms of a "hard" competition model, expressing the view that the antitrust laws should
be used to eliminate all monopolies and restraints of trade and to keep competition
free at all times. See Hale & Hale, supra note 26, at 51-52. Other observers advo-
cate a system of "soft" competition under the antitrust laws, advocating that unfair
practices should not be allowed to thrive and to foreclose existing companies from the
market. Still others would apply a policy of pure laissez-faire advocating that the
high profits obtained through monopoly would be the most beneficial stimulant to
innovation and efficiency. See also G. HAL3 & R. HALE, AUMET POWER 440-80
(1958).
48 See McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying In The Wilerness,
47 VA. L. REV. 373 (1961).
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islative mandates of "public interest, convenience, and necessity"
has left agencies with such wide discretion that uniform application
-of antitrust principles in administrative determinations is virtually
nil." Thus, although there may be a duty on the part of regulatory
agencies to observe national policy by giving adequate consideration
to anticompetitive factors where Congress has not seen fit to provide
transactional immunity, 0 there is some doubt as to an agency's
ability to effectively implement antitrust policy.
This problem has not gone unrecognized, however, and some
valid solutions have been proposed. One such proposal concerns
the enactment of more explicit statutory standards. 1 Although this
would seem to be the most desirable solution, congressional action
is slow and today's need for a practical solution is much more im-
mediate than the long-range potential afforded by new legislation.
Probably the best proposal advanced is that of having the Justice
Department engage in more extensive and systematic participation
in proceedings before the regulatory agencies. This would not only
insure that adequate weight would be given to anticompetitive con-
siderations but would also assist in the assessment of other aspects
of the public interest.' The practical advantages of this proposal
are numerous: It would provide a means to a more complete and ef-
ficient examination of all issues; provide the element of expertise
in the area of antitrust where the regulators may be unqualified;
and, cut down on the considerable time, cost, and litigation repre-
sented by suits brought by the government and private parties chal-
lenging agency approvals.53
At present, however, the approach taken by the court in re-
manding Municipals' complaint to the SEC for further consideration
of anticompetitive effects is somewhat limited. Nonetheless, the de-
49 See G. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TowAIW BUSINESS 771 (rev. ed. 1960).
50 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
5 1 See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMInsTATiV AGENCIES: Ti NEED FOR
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 5-6 (1962); C. PHILLIPs, supra note 3, at 722;
Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L
REV. 1207, 1237-38 (1969).
5 2 Although more specific statutory standards are needed in most all regulatory leg-
islation of the past, some of the newer acts such as the Bank Merger Act [12 U.S.C. §
1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1969)] and the Atomic Energy Commission Act [42 U.S.C. §
2135 (1964)] have taken this approach. The following provision from the Bank Mer-
ger Act may prove to be a legislative model:
In the interest of uniform standards, before acting on any application for ap-
proval of a merger transaction, the responsible agency ... shall request reports
on the competitive factors involved from the Attorney General .... 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969).
53 See Turner, supra note 51, at 1238.
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cision offers a solution whereby agencies - acting under the author-
ity of statutes couched only in terms of public interest and silent
as to the applicability of the antitrust laws - may be required to
display a higher standard of performance in analyzing, explaining,
and justifying particular decisions than has been considered adequate
in the past. The Municipal decision also may reflect a trend of re-
emphasizing our national policy in favor of competition and redi-
recting regulation to its proper perspective in today's economic cli-
mate - as a substitute and not a replacement for competition. 4
Although the Municipal case still leaves the regulators without
the adequate tools to examine competitive issues, until such time as
more constructive action is taken by the legislature, "the courts are
at least experienced enough in these matters to know the kind of
analysis that must be made for a rational judgment, to know what
economic issues are relevant, and to insist that the agency decision
reflect adequate analysis and adequate attention to those issues." 55
MiCHAEL R. OKER
154 "[R]egulation is a substitute for competition and should attempt to put the reg-
ulated industries under the same restraints competition places on nonregulated indus-
tries." C. PmLLiPS, supra note 3, at 127.
55 See Turner, supra note 51, at 1240.
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